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as Gould v. Godd,12 Glaser v. Glaser,13 and the Krause case, reveal that whether
the judicial exceptions are based upon considerations of equitable preclusion
or an actual change in policy, there is no longer the same demand that foreign
divorce decrees not measuring up to our standard be rejected. In a current
article, Professor Howe has carefully retraced the course of the New York cases
to show that recent decisions of the Court of Appeals have been predicated
on theories of jurisdiction in divorce other than status and domicile.1 4 In this
connection it is interesting to note that in the Krause case both parties in the
invalid Nevada divorce, which is indirectly given effect, were and continued to
be residents of the State of New York. and that the defendant in the Nevada
action did not appear and was not personally served.
Possibly very little remains of the concept of public policy that was stated
in the Baker case, because the so-called mores of that day are no longer ours.
The change in mores in New York may have been indicated in a more liberal
rule for marriage annulments,15 in the statutory amendment which virtually
added incurable insanity as another ground for divorce,10 or in a certain degree
of laxity in the granting of absolute divorce on the ground of adultery. Concerning the failure of the New York Courts to apply the principle of comity
with respect to foreign decrees of divorce, and the consequent anomalous results,
the Court of Appeals in the Baker case stated that it was
"better by an adherence to the policy and law of our own jurisdiction, to make the
clash the more and the earlier known and 1felt,
so that the sooner may there be an
7
authoritative determination of the conflict.'
If recent New York cases involve not merely the relaxation of the general principle, but an abandonment of the old concept of public policy, it seems that
the "clash" and "conflict" have been given up.
FREDERICK

L.

KANE t

TAXATION OF INTERSTATE SALES-THE BERWIND CASE

Broad language and well-respected dicta for many years buttressed a firm
belief that sales in interstate commerce could not be taxed by the state of
ultimate delivery without violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution,'
12.
13.

235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).
276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 305 (1938).
14. The Recognition of Foreign Divorcd Decreesi in New York State (1940) 40 CO.
L. Rzv. 373. Cf. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) discussed in Vreeland, Obligatory
Interstate Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A New Trend? (1939) 8 FoRrrA. L. Riv. 80.
15. Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933).
16. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (1928) § 7 (5).
17. People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, at 87.
t" Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 447 (U. S. 1827); Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District, 120 U. S.489, 497 (1887); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642,
648 (1921) ; Sonneborn v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 509 (1923).
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though from a technically factual point of view it was impossible to point to a
single condemnatory holding. None the less the barrier to taxation was more
real than chimerical. Recent decisions indicate a gradually accelerating process
of eroding the foundations of the principle. The disintegration became complete
with2 the Supreme Court's decision in McGoldrick v. Bcrwind-Whitc Coal Mining
Co., where the court upheld the taxation by the state of delivery, New York,
of an interstate sale of goods of a kind obtainable only in the state of shipment.
Such a tax, the Supreme Court reasoned, did not constitute an infringement of
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, since it neither prohibited
the commerce nor discriminated against it in competition with intrastate
commerce. The delivery within the taxing state was said to be a taxable event;
and there are implications in the opinion3 that no other event in the interstate
transit could be so considered, thus avoiding the danger of multiple taxation.
Imposition of the tax was properly said to have no different effect upon interstate commerce from the burdens of use taxes sustained in previous decisions.4
This realistic argument, by ignoring principle and viewing only result, has the
possible advantage of placing substance above form and the disadvantage, in
so doing, of inviting taxation in interstate spheres not involved in the facts of
the case at bar. Though the majority of the court insisted that the delivery
only was the taxable event, the dissenters, led by the Chief Justice, expressed the
apprehension that by permitting a tax upon one component of the interstate
transit it must logically follow on principle that the other parts, i.e., shipment
and transit, would be taxable by states in which they would take place. While
this argument of the dissenters is potent, it loses some of its force if the
implications of the majority opinion may be taken as a guarantee against further
extensions of the Berwind case into other aspects of interstate commerce. Moreover, it is fair to assume that the minority would join the majority in rejecting
further encroachment by the states into the field of interstate commerce., Of
course, since the dissent was based upon principle rather than result, it is possible that the minority in a future case may feel bound by the new principle
inherent in the majority opinion to extend that principle to the spheres which
cause them concern, rather than to sacrifice the logic which they state makes
such extension imperative.
2. 308 U. S. (No. 475), 60 Sup. Ct. 388 (1940). Accord: McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant
Mfg. Co., 303 U. S. (Nos. 45, 474), 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (1940); McGoldrick v. A. H. Du
Grenier Inc., 308 U. S. (Nos. 45, 474), 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (1940); Jagels, "A" Fuel Corp. v.
McGoldrick, 308 U. S. (No. 603), 60 Sup. Ct. 469 (1940).
3. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes-The Beraind-White Case (1940) 53
HMav. L. REv. 909, 926 et seq.
4. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query 286
U. S.472 (1932) ; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S.86 (1934) ; Henneford v. Silas
Mlason Co., 300 U. S.577 (1937) ; Felt &Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S.167 (1939).

5. See Powell, loc. cit. supra note 3.
6. There is substantial authority antedating the Beraind case holding unconstitutional a
tax by the state of shipmenf. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S.307 (1938); Gwin,
White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939) (both cases involved grozs receipts rather
than sales taxes); Adams v. Missis
'ippi Lumber Co., 84 Miss. 23, 36 So. 6S (1904).
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The leading authority on the question of interstate commerce and sales taxation prior to the Berwind case was Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania.7 The case
differed somewhat from the Berwind case because the subject of sale was oil of a
kind obtainable in the local market; the Berwind case involved an unique kind
of coal obtainable only at the seller's mine in Pennsylvania. In the Wiloil case
the court upheld a Pennsylvania tax on oil priced f.o.b. Wilmington, Delaware,
and shipped from Wilmington to Pennsylvania. In so doing, the court reasoned
that since the contracts did not require an interstate shipment, they could have
been fulfilled without breach by local shipment and that therefore any tax on
the transaction constituted a burden upon interstate commerce too remote to
infringe the constitutional prohibition. The obiter in the case clearly indicated
that the state of delivery could tax an interstate sale so long as the interstate
commerce was not contractually mandatory, even though interstate channels were
the only practical means open for consummation. Immunity from state tax was
presaged where interstate commerce was a contractual requisite. While the case
set up an objective standard, facile of application, the employment of its dictum
in a case where interstate transit was practically essential, would have bordered
upon the absurd. 8 Similarly, if a contract requiring interstate shipment would
have freed the transaction of tax, the way would have been opened for
indulgence in the avoidance device of a contractual stipulation involving a slight
extra-territorial deviation in the route of transit in a sale otherwise intrastate.
Viewed solely on its facts, the Berwind case could have been decided within
the framework of the Wiloil dictum, since there was no contractual requirement
of interstate commerce in the former case. Yet the court preferred to state a
broader rule and withhold the protection of the commerce clause even from
those transactions where interstate commerce is required by contract. The
course is still open for a reversion to the Wiloil dictum without violation of the
rule of stare decisis, should a case involving a contractual requirement of interstate transit arise for adjudication.
While the Wiloil case must be viewed as a major assault on the state tax
immunity assumed to be afforded by the commerce clause, its ratio decidendi had
a basis in a previous decision.10
The Berwind case has indeed rendered unnecessary the artificial distinctions
brought forth by the Supreme Court in the past to sustain its destruction of the
interstate commerce barrier against state sales taxation. A doubt remains,
7.

294 U. S. 169 (1935).

8.

See Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays its Way

(1938) 38 CoL. L. Ray. 49, 59.

9. That one deliberately plans his actions to avoid taxation has been said to be immaterial as a determinant of taxability. See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630, 631
(1916) ; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 399, 396 (1930).
10. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405 (1908) (license tax on dealers in
cotton futures valid because seller was at liberty to acquire cotton in market where delivery
was required though some was obtained out of state). The principle hd been rejected
previously in Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507 (1906) (ordinance requiring salesmen
to be licensed voided as to one engaged in solicitation of orders fulfilled by out of state
shipment, though contracts silent as to such requirement).
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which must be clarified by future decisions of the Supreme Court, whether the
Berwind case opens up the possibility of multiple-state taxation of interstate
sales."
SAM UL J. WArmst
A RE-EX.AMINATION OF THE WINKFIELD CASE
The Winkfield' case established the modern rule declaring the respective rights

and liabilities existing within the legal triangle involving a bailor, the bailee and
a third party who damages or converts the bailor's property while in the bailee's

possession. A collision between the steamships Mexican and Winhfidld had
resulted in the loss of the Mexican with some of the mail she was carrying.

The owners of the Winkfield paid a certain amount into court to cover the loss.
The issue framed was whether the British Postmaster-General might recover

out of that sum the full value of the letters, etc., in his possession as bailee,
which had been lost through the collision. The Probate Court, relying on the
authority of Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co.,, decided that since
the Postmaster-General, as representative of the crown, was not under any

liability to the parties interested in the lost letters, etc., he was precluded from
recovering for their value. The Court of Appeal reversed this holding, and
decided that " . . in an action against a stranger for loss of goods caused by
his negligence, the bailee in possession can recover the value of the goods, though
he would have had a good answer to an action by the bailor for damages for the
loss of the thing bailed."13 The court herein expressly overruled the Claridge

case, declaring the position taken by that tribunal to be untenable.4 That case

had decided that a bailee who was under no liability to his bailor for any damage
to the property bailed could not recover for the value of the property.5
11.

t

See Powell, loc. cit. supra note 3.
Member of New York Bar.

1. [1902] P. 42 (C. A.). See (1902) 15 RRv.L. Rnv. 58S; (1900) 13 H,%%,. L. REv. 411.
2. [1892] 1 Q. B. 422, later criticized in Meux v. Great Eastern Ry., [1895] 2 Q. B. 387,
394. See (1892) 6 HARv. L. RE%,. 156.
3. The Wnkfield, [19021 P. 42, 54 (C. A.). Accord: Chamberlain v. West, 37 Minn.
54, 33 N. W. 114 (1887). See also Russel v. Butterfield, 21 Wend. 300, 303 (N. Y. 1839);
Mechanics Bank v. National Bank, 60 N. Y. 40, 52 (1875).
4. The Winkfield, [1902] P. 42, 54 (C. A.).
5. Formerly, in cases of bailments, it was explained that the bailee's right to recover
the full amount was predicated on his liability over to the bailor. 2 BL. CoM-. * 395; 2
K.,., Coatas. (14th ed. 1896) 585; HoLmrErs, Tn Coi.mo,. LAw (18S1) 167. Judge Story
had expressed the opinion that a gratuitous bailee could maintain an action of trespass or
trover against a wrongdoer if the bailee would be liable over to the bailor. Srowy B,%n=rTs
(9th ed. 1878) 248. See also Rooth v. Wilson, 1 Barn. & Aid. 59, 105 Eng. Reprints
22 (1817) (requiring that bailee be liable over to bailor before he could recover); Barker
v. Miller, 6 Johns. 195 (N. Y. 1810). This notion of liability over was manifest as late
as the Claridge case. The bailee, under the circumstances, was not liable to the ownCr;
therefore, the court held he could recover only for the value of his interest.
The Claridge case also argued that a bailee in possession having suffered no losz, could not

